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Abstract. We study the causal effect of trade liberalization on child mortality by exploiting 41 
policy reform experiments in the 1960-2010 period. The Synthetic Control Method for 
comparative case studies allows to compare at the country level the trajectory of post-reform 
health outcomes of treated countries (those which experienced trade liberalization) with the 
trajectory of a combination of similar but untreated countries. In contrast with previous findings, 
we find that the effect of trade liberalization on health outcomes displays a huge heterogeneity, 
both in the direction and the magnitude of the estimated effect. Among the 41 investigated cases, 
19 displayed a significant reduction in child mortality after trade liberalization. In 19 cases there 
was no significant effect, while in three cases we found a significant worsening in child mortality 
after trade liberalization. Trade reforms in democracies, in middle income countries and which 
reduced taxation in agriculture reduce child mortality more. 
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1. Introduction 
The impact of globalization and trade liberalization on welfare and poverty remains 
controversial (Harrison, 2006; Ravallion, 2009). While several economic studies show 
that open trade enhances economic growth (e.g. Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; 
Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2008; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008; Bilmeier and Nannicini, 2013), 
the impact on poverty and inequality is much less clear (e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2007; 
Topalova, 2010; Anukriti and Kumler, 2014). In an elaborate review of the evidence, 
Winters et al. (2004) conclude that “there can be no simple general conclusions about the 
relationship between trade liberalization and poverty”. In a recent update, Winters and 
Martuscelli (2014) argue that this conclusion still holds.1  
In this paper we study the impact of trade liberalization on health, and more 
specifically child mortality. While children’s health is an important indicator of welfare 
and poverty (Deaton, 2003), it is also an important end in its own right (Sen, 1999). 
Moreover child health is also itself important for economic growth and development 
(Levine and Rothman, 2006). 
There is an extensive literature addressing the issue and the mechanisms through 
which trade may affect health, and in particular child mortality (see Blouin et al. 2009 for 
a survey). These include the impact on economic growth, poverty and inequality (Pritchett 
and Summers 1996; Deaton, 2003), public health expenditures (Kumar et al. 2013; Filmer 
and Pritchett, 1999), knowledge spillovers (Deaton, 2004; Owen and Wu, 2007), dietary 
changes (Cornia et al. 2008; Chege et al. 2015; Oberländer et al. 2016), food prices 
(Headey, 2014; Fledderjohann et al. 2016), fertility and the labour market (Anukriti and 
Kumler 2014). Not only are there many ways that trade may affect people’s health, the 
impact may be both positive and negative.   
Despite the importance of this topic there are only two published economic studies 
that quantitatively assess the impact of trade on health on a global basis. Levine and 
Rothman (2006) use a cross-country analysis to measure the (long-run) effect of trade on 
life expectancy and child mortality. Because trade can be endogenous to income and 
health, they follow Frankel and Romer’s (1999) approach by exploiting the exogenous 
component of trade predicted from a gravity model. They find that trade significantly 
improves health outcomes, although the effect tends to be weaker and often insignificant 
when they control for countries’ income levels and some other covariates. The authors 
                                                          
1 See also Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004; 2007) for extensive reviews on the poverty and distributional 
effects of trade liberalization in developing countries. 
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conclude that one of the main channels through which trade openness improves health is 
through enhanced incomes.  
The second study, by Owen and Wu (2007), uses panel data econometrics. 
Controlling for income and other observed and unobserved determinants of health through 
fixed effects, they find that trade openness improves life expectancy and child mortality in 
a panel of more than 200 developed and developing countries. They also find evidence 
suggesting that some of the positive correlations between trade and health can be 
attributed to knowledge spillovers – an hypothesis previously advanced by Deaton (2004). 
However, also in their analysis the impact is not always robust. For example, when the 
authors work with the sub-sample of only developing countries, the trade effect on health 
is weaker, and not significant when child mortality is considered. 
Given the fact that trade can affect health, and in particular child mortality, through 
different channels, and the conclusion of Winters et al. (2004) that the impact of trade 
liberalization can be different under different economic and institutional conditions, the 
average effect as measured by previous cross-country studies may hide important 
heterogeneity among countries and regions.  
To analyze this issue we use a different methodology with respect to previous 
studies, namely the Synthetic Control Method (SCM) recently developed by Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003) and by Abadie et al. (2010). Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) applied 
the SCM to study the relationship between trade liberalization and growth. Our approach 
follows their application of the SCM by considering also aggregation of the units under 
investigation across specific dimensions (see Cavallo et al. 2013).  
The SCM allows choosing the best comparison units in comparative case studies. 
Using this approach, we compare the post-reform child mortality of countries that 
experienced trade liberalization – treated countries – with child mortality of a 
combination of similar, but untreated countries. Using this method, we assess separately 
(i.e. at the country level) the health impact of 41 trade liberalization events which 
occurred during the 1960-2010 period. Among other things, this approach offers the key 
advantage over the other methodologies of allowing the explicit identification of the 
heterogeneity of the reform effects.  
The SCM methodology allows flexibility and transparency in the selection of the 
counterfactual, and thus improves the comparability between treated and untreated units. 
Importantly, the SCM also accounts for endogeneity bias due to omitted variables by 
accounting for the presence of time-varying unobservable confounders. Moreover, it 
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allows separating short-run versus long-run effects, an issue not formally addressed by 
previous studies but of particular relevance when the focus of the analysis is the effect of 
trade reforms (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013).  
We find that in the 41 investigated cases, about 19 (46%) showed a short- and long-
run significant reduction in the child mortality after trade liberalization, with an average 
effect of about 22% in the long-run. For 19 other cases we do not find any effect of trade 
liberalization. In 3 cases (7%) we find a significant increase in child mortality after trade 
liberalization. Our results are robust when controlling for potential confounding effect, 
and in particular for the concomitant occurrence of political reforms (i.e. democratic 
transition), and when considering potential spill over effects.  
In our analysis of the potential channels through which trade liberalization affects 
child health, we do find evidence supporting the idea that child mortality declines more 
when trade liberalization happened in democracies, in middle income countries and when 
it causes a reduction of taxation in the agricultural sector, where many of the poorest 
people are employed.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next Section the 
methodology  the synthetic control approach  will be presented and discussed. Section 
3 presents the data on trade policy reforms, child mortality and other covariates used in 
the empirical exercise. In Section 4 the main results will be presented and discussed. 
Section 5 presents robustness checks and some extensions, while in Section 6 we further 
investigate potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.    
2. Methodology 
The empirical identification of the causal effect of trade policies on health outcomes 
is difficult because trade policies tend to be correlated with many other social, political 
and economic factors. Moreover, the effect of trade policies on inequality and poverty in 
developing countries tends to be country-, time- and case-specific (see Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2004; 2007).  
Previous quantitative studies do not fully account for all these issues 
simultaneously. The instrumental variable approach of Levine and Rothman (2006), relies 
on the assumption that the estimated trade share from gravity model is not correlated with 
other factors, such as institutions or growth, that by themselves could affect child 
mortality (see Nunn and Trefler, 2014). The panel fixed effects approach proposed by 
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Owen and Wu (2007) assumed that in absence of trade reforms, health outcomes for the 
treated and control groups would have followed parallel trajectories over time, an 
assumption often violated and sensitive to the fixed effects specification (Bertrand et al. 
2004; Ryan et al. 2015).2 In addition, both these approaches do not provide insights on the 
potential heterogeneity of the trade reforms effects on poverty and inequality.   
To overcome the identification problem we use the synthetic control method (SCM) 
proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010). The SCM is an 
approach for programme evaluation, developed in the context of comparative case studies, 
that relaxes the parallel trends assumption of the difference-in-difference method.3 The 
SCM, besides accounting for time varying unobserved effects, is particularly suitable for 
those contexts where the effect of the policy under investigation is supposed to be 
heterogeneous across the investigated units. Moreover, as the SCM offers a dynamic 
estimate of the average effects, its results add additional insights on the dynamic effect of 
trade policy reforms on health outcomes, as some of the effects may require some time to 
emerge (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013). Finally, The SCM estimator is both externally 
and internally valid, as it combines properties of large cross-country studies, which often 
lack internal validity, and of single country case studies, that often cannot be generalized. 
In what follows we summarize the SCM approach following Abadie et al. (2010) 
and Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) who studied the relation between trade liberalization 
and growth. We also discuss the problem of aggregation of the units of investigation 
based on Cavallo et al. (2013). 
2.1 The Synthetic Control Method 
Consider a panel of  IC + 1 countries over T periods, where country I changes its trade 
policy at time T0 < T, while all the other countries of IC remain closed to international 
trade, thus representing a sample of potential control or donor pool. The treatment effect 
for country i at time t can be defined as follows: 
(1)   𝜏𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡(1) −  𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 −  𝑌𝑖𝑡(0)    
                                                          
2 In fact, Owen and Wu pooled together developed and developing countries in the same fixed effects 
regression. In so doing, as an effect of the Preston curve (see Preston, 1975) in the relation between health 
and income, the probability that the parallel assumption inherent in fixed effects model is violated, appears 
high in this context. 
3 See Ryan et al. (2015) for an in depth discussion about the plausibility of the parallel assumption of the 
difference-in-difference (DiD) estimator, and Kreif et al. (2016) for a comparison of DiD with the synthetic 
control method in the context of health policy.  
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where 𝑌𝑖𝑡(𝑇)  represents the potential outcome associated with 𝑇 ∈ {0,1} , that in our 
application refers to the level of under five mortality rate in an economy closed (0) or 
open (1) to international trade, respectively. The statistic of interest is the vector of 
dynamic treatment effects (𝜏𝑖,𝑇0+1, … , 𝜏𝑖,𝑇).   As is well known from the program 
evaluation literature, in any period 𝑡 > 𝑇0  the estimation of the treatment effect is 
complicated by the lack of the counterfactual outcome, 𝑌𝑖𝑡(0) . To circumvent this 
problem, the SCM identifies the above treatment effects under the following general 
model for potential outcomes (Abadie et al. 2010):    
(2)           𝑌𝑗𝑡(0) = 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑋𝑗𝜃𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡𝜇𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝛿𝑡 is an unknown common term with constant factor loadings across units; 𝑋𝑗 is a 
vector of relevant observed covariates (not affected by the intervention) and 𝜃𝑡 the related 
vector of parameters; 𝜇𝑗  is a country specific unobservable, with 𝜆𝑡  representing the 
unknown common factor; 4  finally, 𝜀𝑗𝑡 are transitory shocks with zero mean. As explained 
later on, the variables that we include in the vector 𝑋𝑗 (real per capita GDP, population 
growth, fraction of rural population, frequency of wars and conflicts, female primary 
education, and child mortality) refer to the pre-treatment period. Hence, we are assuming 
that they are exogenous, and thus not affected by the treatment (trade liberalization). Put 
differently, we are ruling out any kind of “anticipation” effects (see Abadie, 2013).5  
Next, define  𝑊 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝐼𝐶)′ as a generic (IC  1) vector of weights such that 
𝑤𝑗 ≥ 0 and  ∑ 𝑤𝑗 = 1. Every value of 𝑊 represents a possible counterfactual for country 
i. Moreover, define ?̅?𝑗
𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑠𝑌𝑗𝑠
𝑇0
𝑠=1  as a linear combination of pre-treatment outcomes. 
Abadie et al. (2010) showed that, as long as one can choose 𝑊∗such that 
(3)        ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗?̅?𝑗
𝑘𝐼𝐶
𝐽=1 = ?̅?𝑖
𝑘    and     ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑋𝑗
𝐼𝐶
𝐽=1 = 𝑋𝑖,  
then 
(4)              ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑌𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝐶
𝐽=1  
is an unbiased estimator of the average treatment effect, 𝜏𝑖𝑡.  
Note that condition (3) can hold exactly only if (?̅?𝑗
𝑘, 𝑋𝑗) belongs to the convex hull 
of [(?̅?1
𝑘, 𝑋𝑗), … , (?̅?𝐼𝐶
𝑘 , 𝑋𝐼𝐶)]. However, in practice, the synthetic control 𝑊
∗ is selected so 
                                                          
4 Note that standard difference-in-differences approach set 𝜆𝑡  to be constant across time. Differently, the 
SCM allows the impact of unobservable country heterogeneity to vary over time.  
5 Namely that those covariates immediately change in response to the anticipation of the future reform. 
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that condition (3) holds approximately. This is obtained by minimizing the distance 
between the vector of pre-treatment characteristics of the treated country and the vector of 
the pre-treatment characteristics of the potential synthetic control, with respect to 𝑊∗ , 
according to a specific metric.6 Then, any deviation from condition (3) imposed by this 
procedure can be evaluated in the data, and represents a part of the SCM output.7        
The SCM has three key advantages in comparison with the DiD and other estimators 
normally used in the program evaluation literature. First, it is more transparent, as the 
weights 𝑊∗ clearly identify the countries that are used to estimate the counterfactual. 
Second, it is more flexible because the set of IC potential controls can be restricted to 
make the underlying country comparisons more appropriate. Third, it is based on 
identification assumptions that are weaker, as it allows for the effect of unobservable 
confounding factors to be time variant. Yet, identification is still based on the assumption 
that the attribution of a given treatment to one country does not affect the other countries, 
and/or that there are not spillover effects (stable unit treatment value assumption 
(SUTVA)).8  
The SCM methodology has two main drawbacks. First, it does not distinguish 
between direct and indirect causal effects, a standard weakness of the program evaluation 
literature. Second, the small number of observations often involved in such case studies 
translates into the impossibility to use standard inferential techniques. Following Abadie 
et al. (2010) we try to address this problem by making use of placebo tests. These tests 
compare the magnitude of the estimated effect on the treated country with the size of 
those obtained by assigning the treatment randomly to any (untreated) country of the 
donor pool.  
2.2 Measuring Average Effect 
In previous SCM applications the analysis of the results have been largely 
conducted at the level of (each) single unit of investigation, e.g. at the country level. 
                                                          
6 Abadie et al. (2010) choose 𝑊∗ as the value of  𝑊 that minimizes: ∑ 𝑣𝑚(𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚𝑊)
2𝑘
𝑚=1 , where 𝑣𝑚 is 
a weight that reflects the relative importance that we assign to the m-th variable when we measure the 
discrepancy between 𝑋1 and 𝑋0𝑊. Typically, these weights are selected in accordance to the covariates’ 
predictive power on the outcome. We followed the same approach.    
7 In particularly, one of the key outcomes of the SCM procedure is the estimate of the root mean square 
predicted error (RMSPE) between the treated and the synthetic control, measured in the pre-treatment 
period.   
8 Working with macro data and trade reforms, the probability that the treatment assignment to one country 
may have – partial or general equilibrium – effects on the others could not, a priory, be ruled out. However, 
as we will argue in the results section, in our specific context this problem does not appear particularly 
severe.  
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However, when the analysis covers many countries, as in the present study, may be 
interesting to measure the average treatment effects for specific groups of countries. To do 
this, we follow the approach by Cavallo et al. (2013). Denote by (?̂?1,𝑇0+1, … , ?̂?1,𝑇) a 
specific estimation of the trade liberalization effects on child mortality of the country of 
interest 1. The average trade liberalization effects across G countries of interest. The 
estimated average effect across these G trade reforms can then be computed as:      
(5)   𝜏̅ = (𝜏̅𝑇0+1, … , 𝜏 ̅𝑇) = 𝐺
−1 ∑ (?̂?𝑔,𝑇0+1, … , ?̂?𝑔,𝑇).
𝐺
𝑔=1  
9 
To estimate whether this (dynamic) average treatment effect is statistically significant, 
Cavallo et al. (2013) proposed an approach that allows consistent inference measurement 
regardless of the number of available controls or pre-treatment periods, although the 
precision of inference clearly increases with their number. The underlying logic of this 
methodology is to first apply the SCM algorithm to every potential control in the donor 
pool to evaluate whether the estimated effect of the treated country outperforms the ones 
of the fake experiments. 10  
Furthermore, because we are interested in valid inferences on the 𝜏̅ average effect, we 
need to construct the distribution of the average placebo effects to compute the year t 
average specific p-value. Following Cavallo et al. (2013), we first compute all the placebo 
effects for the treated countries, as summarized in footnote 10. As we are interested in 
computing the p-value of the average effect, we then consider at each year of the post-
treatment period, all the possible average placebo effects for any possible aggregation of 
placebos, G. The number of possible placebo averages is computed as follows:  
   (6)     𝑁𝑃𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ =  ∏ 𝐽𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 .   
The comparison between the average effect of the group of treated countries, with the 
average effect of all the possible groups deriving from any potential combination of non-
                                                          
9 Note also that, because the size of the country specific effect will depend on the level of the child mortality 
rate, one needs to normalize the estimates before aggregating the individual country effects This is done by 
setting the child mortality of the treated country equal to 1 in the year of trade reform, T0. 
10 For example, if one wants to measure inference for the trade liberalization effect on child mortality for 
each of the ten post-reform years, it is possible to compute the year-specific significance level, namely the 
p‒value, for the estimated trade reform effect as follows:  𝑝−value𝑡 = Pr (?̂?1,𝑡
𝑃𝐿 < ?̂?1,𝑡) =
∑ 𝐼
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 (?̂?1,𝑡
𝑃𝐿𝑗
<?̂?1,𝑡)
# of controls
, 
where ?̂?1,𝑡
𝑃𝐿 is the year specific effect of trade reform when control country j is assigned a placebo reform at 
the same time as the treated country 1 and is calculated using the same algorithm outlined for ?̂?1,𝑡. The 
operation is performed for each country j of the donor pool to build the distribution of the fake experiments 
so as to evaluate how the estimate ?̂?1,𝑡 is positioned in that distribution.   
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treated countries yields the p-value for the average effects. After ranking each year-
specific average trade reform effect in the placebo distribution, the yearly p-value of the 
average effect is thus computed as the ratio between the number of average placebo 
groups that display a higher effect than the actual group of treated countries, over the 
number of possible placebo averages.11 
3. Data, Measures and Sample Selection 
The first issue to address in our empirical analysis is the measurement of trade 
liberalization episodes. Following the cross-country growth literature we use the binary 
indicator of Sachs and Warner (1995) as recently revisited, corrected and extended by 
Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Using this index, a country is classified closed to 
international trade in any given year where at least one of the following five conditions is 
satisfied (otherwise, it will be considered open): (1) overall average tariffs exceed 40 
percent; (2) non-tariff barriers cover more than 40 percent of its imports; (3) it has a 
socialist economic system; (4) the black market premium on the exchange rate exceeds 20 
percent; (5) much of its exports are controlled by a state monopoly. Following Giavazzi 
and Tabellini (2005) we define a trade liberalization episode (or a “treatment”) as the first 
year when a country can be considered open to international trade according to the criteria 
above, after a preceding period where the economy was closed to international trade. 
Finally, as discussed in Billmeier and Nannicini (2013), trade reforms may not occur 
suddenly, but there may be a gradual shift toward more liberal trade policies. If so, this 
means that our treated variable based on a binary indicator is measured with error. Note 
that this problem will introduce attenuation bias in our estimated reform effects, meaning 
that our results are underestimating the actual impact. 
To measure health outcomes  (𝑌𝑖𝑡), we use the under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live 
births), hereafter U5MR for brevity, from the United Nation Inter-agency Group for Child 
Mortality.12 The choice of this indicator of health is based on several grounds. First, as 
discussed extensively by Deaton (2006), it represents a better health indictor in 
comparison to life expectancy. Second, the U5MR has the key advantage of being 
available on a yearly basis from 1960 for almost all the countries in the world. This is a 
key property for our identification strategy, because the SCM works with yearly data, and 
the dataset covers a period when many trade reforms happened. Third, from a conceptual 
                                                          
11 For a more formal derivation of this methodology, see Cavallo et al. (2013).  
12 See: http://www.childmortality.org. 
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point of view, the U5MR represents a key index of the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (see Alkema et al. 2014), and because improvements in child 
mortality happen at the bottom of the income distribution (Acemoglu et al. 2014), which 
made it especially relevant in this respect.  
The vector of covariates 𝑋𝑗 used to identify the synthetic controls has been selected 
on the basis of previous (cross-country) studies on the determinants of health and child 
mortality (see, e.g., Charmarbagwala et al., 2004; Owen and Wu, 2007; Hanmer et al., 
2015). More specifically, the synthetic controls are identified using the following 
covariates: real per capita GDP (source: Penn World Table); population growth (Penn 
World Table); the fraction of rural population into total population (source: FAO); years 
of wars and conflicts based on Kudamatsu (2012) (source: Armed Conflict database, 
Gleditsch et al. 2002); female primary education (source: Barro and Lee, 2010); the 
average U5MR in the pre-treatment period (source: United Nations). Finally, in the 
robustness checks we also consider the Polity2 index from the Polity IV data set (see 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2007), to classify countries as autocracy or democracy,13 and data 
for agricultural policy distortions from the World Bank “Agricultural Distortion database” 
(see Anderson and Nelgen, 2008). 
Concerning the sample of countries, we started from a dataset of about 130 
developing countries. However, for about 33 of them, information related to the trade 
policy reform index is missing (see Wacziarg and Welch, 2008 for details). A further 
selection was based on the following criteria. First, the treated countries were liberalized 
at the earliest in 1970, to have at least 10 years of pre-treatment observations to match 
with the synthetic control.14 Second, there exist a sufficient number of countries with 
similar characteristics that remain closed to international trade (untreated countries) for at 
least 10 years before and after each trade reform, so as to provide a sufficient donor pool 
of potential controls to build the synthetic unit and the placebo tests. Moreover, as 
                                                          
13 The Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from -10 to +10 to each country and year, with higher values 
associated with better democracies. We code a country as democratic (= 1, 0 otherwise) in each year that the 
Polity2 index is strictly positive. A political reform into democracy occurs in a country-year when the 
democracy indicator switches from 0 to 1. See Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Olper et al. (2014) for 
details. 
14 Abadie at al. (2010) show that the bias of the synthetic control estimator is clearly related to the number 
of pre-intervention periods. Therefore, in designing a synthetic control study it is of crucial importance to 
collect sufficient information on the affected unit and the donor pool for a large pre-treatment window.  
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suggested by Abadie (2013), we eliminated from the donor pool countries that have 
suffered large idiosyncratic shocks to the outcome of interest during the studied period.15  
A final critical issue is related to the criteria used to select the donor pool, namely 
the potential controls used to build each synthetic control. From this perspective we face a 
non-trivial trade-off. On the one hand, by considering in the donor pool only countries 
belonging to the same region of the treated unit could be a strategy that would allow 
having countries with a relatively strong degree of similarity with the treated unit, and that 
are likely to be affected by the same regional shocks as the treated unit. On the other hand, 
in our specific context this approach could present some problems. First, because it would 
imply few control countries in several SCM experiments, and would thus worsen the pre-
treatment fit and prevent the placebo tests. Second, the use of a donor pool with only 
countries that belong to the same region in an exercise that studies the macro effects of 
trade reforms, may violate the SUTVA assumption, because the spillover effects of trade 
liberalization in neighboring countries are likely more sever. Given these considerations, 
we do not impose further constraints in the selection of the donor pool, leaving the 
selection of the best synthetic control to the SCM algorithm. However, as a robustness 
check, we also discuss the results obtained by imposing more restrictions in the choice of 
the donor pool.  
Using these criteria, we ended up with a usable data set of 80 developing countries, 
of which 41 experienced a trade liberalization episode (see Tables A1-A4, in the 
Appendix A).16 The dataset has data from 1960 to 2010. However, the time span used in 
the SCM is different for each country case-study based on the year of the liberalization. 
For each experiment, we use the years from T0‒10 to T0  as the pre-treatment period to 
select the synthetic control, and the years from T0  to T0+5 and T0+10 as the post-treatment 
periods, on which evaluating the outcome, where T0 is the year of trade liberalization.  
4. Results  
This section summarizes the results obtained from our 41 SCM experiments. We first 
present the effect of trade liberalization on child mortality aggregated over all experiments 
and by regions and then the detailed results at the country level.  
                                                          
15 Countries excluded from the donor pool due to anomalous spikes in child mortality are: the Republic of 
Congo, Lesotho, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. Note, the inclusion of these country do not change at all the final 
outcomes and conclusions. 
16 More precisely, using these criteria we end up with 45 usable treated countries. However, for three 
countries it has been impossible to find a good counterfactual, due to their extreme high level of child 
mortality in comparison to the donor pool. These countries are: Mali, Niger, and Sierra Leone.     
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4.1 Average Effects  
Figure 1 illustrates the aggregated average effect of trade liberalization on child 
mortality computed using equation (5) for the 41 trade liberalizations for which a good 
counterfactual could be constructed and that met our inclusion criteria. The solid line 
represents the average child mortality of the treated units and the dashed line shows the 
evolution of child mortality for the average synthetic control. The vertical line represents 
the year of trade liberalization (T0). Before trade openness, the average treated and 
synthetic control are very close, consistent with a good fit between them. On average, 
trade liberalization reduced child mortality. After trade liberalization, average child 
mortality rates of the treated countries falls below the child mortality rates of the synthetic 
control.  Five years after trade openness, child mortality is on average 6.7% percent lower 
in the treated countries than in their synthetic control (p-value  < 0.01), an effect that 
increases to 9.5 (p-value  < 0.01) after 10 years. 
Figure 2 reports the dynamic treatment effect by regions computed in a similar way 
than before, namely by aggregating each country-year treatment effect at the regional 
level. In order to make the graph more readable, each regional effect is now obtained by 
averaging the contribution of all the treated countries within the same region in terms of 
yearly deviation of the outcome variable with respect to the one of the respective synthetic 
control.17 Before the year of the treatment T0, the lines are close to zero, meaning that also 
at regional level the treated countries and their synthetic controls behave quite similarly. 
In the year of the treatment T0, each regional line starts to become negative, and more so 
moving away from T0, except in the case of African countries where, instead, the line 
approaches zero. On average, in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin 
America and Asian countries child mortality reduced more (or increased less) after trade 
liberalization than in the respective synthetic control, but not in Africa. The average effect 
of trade liberalization on child mortality is strongest in the sample of MENA and Asian 
countries. In the long run (T0+10) child mortality is 23% lower than in the synthetic 
control, an effect that is significant for both regions (p-value < 0.01 for MENA and p-
value < 0.05 for Asian countries). The average effect for Latin American countries is 
                                                          
17 As discussed at the end of section 2 (see footnote 9), we normalize the estimates before aggregating the 
individual country effects, by setting the child mortality of the treated unit equal to 1 in the year of trade 
reform, T0. Thus, the difference in the outcome variable between the treated and the synthetic counterfactual 
in the post-reform period represents an estimate of the average treatment effect.   
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lower (around 14%) but still strongly significant (p-value < 0.01). Interestingly, the gap 
between these two groups grows over time. While the effect increases over the 10 year 
period for the MENA and Asian countries, most of the impact is reached after 5-6 years in 
the Latin American group (as the treatment effect line flattens out). For the sample of 
African countries, on average, there is no significant difference between treated countries 
and their synthetic control: the average increase in child mortality of +0.4% at time T0+10 
is not significant (p-value = 0.34).        
In summary, these averages indicate that trade liberalization reduced child mortality, 
but there is regional heterogeneity.   
4.2 Country Level Effects  
Table 1 reports the numerical comparison of the outcome variable between the 
treated and the respective synthetic control for each country that implemented trade 
liberalization in our dataset. The overall pre-treatment fit, measured by the root mean 
square prediction error (RMSPE), is reported for each experiment. The RMSPE values 
indicate that the pre-treatment fit is quite good in most of the cases (17 have RMSPE < 1, 
18 have RMSPE between 1 ÷ 5, and only 6 have RMSPE > 5). 
In Table 1 the results of the significance of the Placebo tests (p-value) are reported in 
the last column of Table 1. We refer to Appendix A and B for more details on the 
covariates and the synthetic controls for each of the countries and a series of placebo tests. 
The comparisons between the post-treatment outcome of the treated unit with its synthetic 
control after five (U5MR T0+5) and ten years (U5MR T0+10) from the reforms, represent 
two estimates of the (dynamic) treatment effect. Countries are ranked based on the 
magnitude of the ten year treatment effect (T0+10). 
What is obviously clear from Table 1 is the strong heterogeneity of the effects. The 
10-year impacts range from +41% to 52%. The country case studies where the p-value is 
lower than 0.15 are at the top and the bottom of the table. More than half of the country 
case studies (22) have a p-value lower than 0.15 (and for 17 the p-value < 0.10). From 
these 22 significant effects, 19 are positive (i.e. trade liberalization reduced child 
mortality) and 3 have a negative effect (i.e. it worsened child mortality). With a p-value 
cut-off of 10%, 15 are positive and 2 negative. 
In all five Asian SCM experiments trade liberalizing countries experienced a 
reduction in U5MR that significantly (p-value < 0.10) outperforms the one of the 
respective synthetic control. These five countries are Indonesia (reform in 1970), Sri 
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Lanka (1977), Philippines (1988), Nepal (1991) and Bangladesh (1996). Among these 
countries. The strongest effects were in Nepal and Sri Lanka, where the U5MR is, 
respectively,  41% and 28% lower than the estimated counterfactual after ten years.  
In Latin America, for most trade liberalization episodes (seven out of eleven) the 
treated countries  outperform the U5MR reduction of the respective synthetic control. The 
strongest improvements following trade reforms were in Chile (1976) and Perù (1988). 
Ten years after the trade reform, the U5MR was about 31% lower than that of synthetic 
control in Chile and 34% in Perù. In other cases the effect of trade liberalization is not 
significant. 
The large majority of SSA countries are concentrated at the bottom half of Table 1, 
meaning that the health effect of these trade liberalization episodes has been small or 
negative. In some SSA countries child health also benefited from trade liberalization: 
Gambia (year of reform 1985), Ghana (1985), Tanzania (1995), and Burundi (1999) 
displayed all a positive and significant effect of trade liberalization on child mortality. 
However, in most SSA countries the effect was not significant (13 out of 20). Moreover, 
the three countries were there was a significant increase of child mortality after trade 
liberalization are all in SSA: Kenya (–23%), Mauritania (–24%) and South Africa (–52%). 
In all MENA countries (Morocco (1984), Tunisia (1989), Turkey (1989) and Egypt 
(1995)) trade liberalization reduced child mortality. The U5MR dynamic of the treated 
country outperforms that of the respective synthetic control, with a magnitude ranging 
from 8% for Morocco to 33% for Turkey. In all cases except Morocco, the reduction of 
child mortality is statistically significant at the 15% level (see Table 1).  
In summary, these results indicate that trade liberalization has contributed to reducing 
child mortality in almost half of the countries in our sample. In most other countries, there 
was no significant impact. In three countries there was a negative effect, meaning that 
trade liberalization seems to have increased child mortality. This of course raises the 
question what are the reasons for these different effects.  In the rest of this paper we first 
check (Section 5) whether our findings may be due to problems with the methodology or 
confounding effects which our approach has not sufficiently covered.  Next (in Section 6) 
we look at a few additional factors which either the literature or occasional observations 
suggest may be influencing the impact of trade liberalization.  
5. Robustness Tests 
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We will now discuss and try to test whether our results could be driven (or 
influenced) by specific assumptions or other shocks which occurred around the trade 
reform or in the post-treatment period.  
5.1 Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA)  
A first issue of our identification strategy is the possible violation of the SUTVA 
assumption, namely that the treatment status of one unit does not affect the potential 
outcomes of the other (control) units. If this circumstance is not satisfied, the size of the 
effects could be either over or under estimated.   
However, in our specific context the existence of these spillover effects are not so 
obvious a priori, since trade liberalization can exert an effect on child mortality only 
indirectly. Clearly, the existence of spillover effects would be more likely if the outcome 
variable under investigation would be, for example, trade flows or foreign direct 
investment, instead of child mortality.  In fact, if trade liberalization in one country has led 
to a successful attraction of trade flows, other geographical proximate countries may have 
received lower trade flows. However, this reasoning cannot be applied to child mortality, 
at least directly, because the relationship between trade and child mortality is, a priori, 
difficult to establish. 
At any rate, to be on the safe side, we re-ran the SCM experiments by excluding from 
the donor pool those countries that share a national border with the treated unit, so that the 
possible spillover effects will be attenuated. The results for those SCM experiments where 
the SUTVA may be violated are presented in bold in Table C1 (see Appendix C). As is 
evident from the figures, the size of the effect is only slightly affected by the exclusion of 
countries sharing a common border with the treated unit. The only cases where the size of 
the effect changes significantly are those of Mauritania and Mozambique. However, in the 
first case, the negative effect of trade liberalization on child mortality previously detected, 
shrinks to almost zero, and remains insignificant. In the case of Mozambique, the SCM 
experiments resulting from the exclusion of the border countries has a very high value of 
RMSPE (i.e. 59.2), suggesting that this experiment is not reliable. Hence, our main results 
and conclusions do not appear to be affected by the possible violation of the SUTVA. 
5.2 Political Reforms 
If another important change which affects child health (and which is not (fully) 
captured by the SCM) occurred around the trade reform, our estimated impacts could be 
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the result of these “other changes” rather than of trade reforms.  One factor which has 
been identified in the literature as affecting child mortality is the political system of a 
country, and particularly the change in the political system. Several studies show that 
political reforms (in particular the move from autocracy to democracy) affect health 
outcomes (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Kudamatsu, 2012; Pieters et al., 2016). Other 
studies argue theoretically (Zissimos, 2014) and show empirically (Giavazzi and 
Tabellini, 2005) that trade and political reforms are often interrelated in developing 
countries. In several of the countries in our dataset there have been important political 
reforms, which sometimes have occurred around the same time as the trade liberalization.   
A related, but distinct, issue is that the nature of the political system could affect the 
trade liberalization effects. In case there would be no confounding effects due to political 
changes (and thus no bias in our estimated numbers) it may be that some political systems 
are more conducive to e.g. protecting the poor against potential negative effects of trade 
liberalization or enhance the poor’s capacity to benefit from new opportunities due to 
trade liberalization. This could then affect child mortality. Standard political economy 
arguments based on the median voter model suggest that, on average, democracies are 
more likely to contribute to pro-poor outcomes than autocracies. 
We will consider both issues. A simple way to check whether our findings suggest 
that the nature of the political regime interacts with the trade reforms is to aggregate the 
SCM results according to the countries’ political regime. We therefore aggregate the 
nineteen countries which displayed a significant improvement in child mortality after the 
trade liberalization in three not overlapping groups, using the Polity 2 index of 
democracy. In order to classify these countries, we considered the political regime in 
place in the years “close to” the economic transition, which we define as the five years 
before and after trade liberalization.18  
For this purpose we compare the trade reform effects which occurred under three 
different political regimes: (i) trade reforms close to political reforms (for all countries in 
our analysis ”political reform” means democratization, i.e. the move from autocracy to 
democracy), (ii) trade reform in consolidated democracy and (iii) trade reform in 
autocracy. In the first group (G1) there are five countries where democratization occurred 
                                                          
18 The choice of use five years before and five years after trade liberalization, instead of the whole period of 
each analysis (i.e. ten years before and ten years after trade liberalization) has been taken to better isolate the 
political condition near the treatment period. However, even classifying the treated countries using the 
whole period, the main results are not affected.  
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close to the trade reforms.19 The second (G2) and third (G3) groups include countries that 
during the considered period (five years before and five years after the trade reform) were 
permanent democracies or permanent  autocracies, respectively.20          
Figure 3 presents the results of the (dynamic) average effect across each country 
group presented above.21 The three lines represent the average effect in countries that 
experienced the trade reform near political reforms (circle line), in democracies (square 
line) and in autocracies (triangle line).  There is a significant average reduction in child 
mortality in all three groups (p-value < 0.05 for all groups), and the difference between 
the groups is relatively small.  
Democratic countries experiencing trade liberalization have an average reduction in 
child mortality of 25% at T0+10, which is the highest.  For the group of countries where 
trade liberalization occurred close to political reforms the average reduction in child 
mortality was 22%.22  In the group of autocracies the average reduction is 18%.  
Thus, first of all, these findings do not suggest that political reforms 
(democratizations), per se, are driving the effect of trade liberalization on child mortality, 
ceteris paribus. In fact, the average reduction in child mortality is relatively similar in the 
three groups, and the reduction in permanent democracies is higher than the one in the 
group where political reforms and trade reforms are occurring simultaneously.  
Second, the finding that the impact of trade liberalization on child mortality is more 
positive on average (meaning lead to a stronger reduction in child mortality) in 
democracies than in autocracies are consistent with the hypothesis that the poor are more 
likely to benefit from trade liberalization in a democracy, although, as already mentioned, 
the difference is not very large.  This result is somewhat different than earlier findings of 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) who found that when an economic liberalization preceded 
the political reform, countries perform better in term of GDP growth, although we know 
                                                          
19 Because the year of trade and political reforms can be measured with error, we consider all countries 
where the political reform occurred from two years before the trade liberalization (T0‒2). However, only two 
countries, Burundi and Guatemala switches to democracy two years before trade liberalization, while other 
countries switch one year before (Nepal, Philippines and Nicaragua). In order to determine the year of 
democratization using the polity2 variable, we follow Persson and Tabellini (2008).  
20  The composition of the three groups is as follows: G1 (Burundi, Guatemala, Nepal, Nicaragua and 
Philippines); G2 (Bangladesh, Brazil, El Salvador, Gambia,  Perù, Sri Lanka and Turkey); G3 (Egypt, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Tanzania and Tunisia). Note that, the only country displaying a positive and significant 
effect that has been excluded from these aggregation is Chile as, according to the polity 2 variable, is the 
only country experiencing a transition to autocracy near trade liberalization. 
21 Once again the aggregation is based on equation (5) and the value of child mortality is normalized by 
setting child mortality of the treated country to be equal to 1 in the year of trade reform (T0).    
22 Note that, ever considering all the cases (not only those individually positive and significant) the main 
results are very close.  
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that there is not necessarily a direct link between GDP growth and child mortality (see 
Deaton, 2003).    
5.3 HIV/AIDS 
The fact that the large majority of SSA countries are concentrated at the bottom half 
of Table 1, meaning that the health effect of these trade liberalization episodes has been 
less positive (and sometimes negative) than in other regions, suggests that there may be an 
SSA-specific effect.  One factor is income. SSA is the poorest region and income may 
influence the trade impacts.  We will discuss and analyze the income factor in the next 
section.   
Another potential factor is the spread of HIV, a disease which has affected overall 
mortality around the world, and which has been particularly devastating in some African 
countries.  Intuitively it seems possible that the spread of HIV could influence our results. 
Oster (2012) explains how trade liberalization may have stimulated the HIV/AIDS spread 
in SSA countries. 
Several countries for which the trade liberalization effects are insignificant or 
negative (those at the bottom of Table 1) have seen a deterioration in child health due to 
the spread of HIV/AIDS infections in the mid-1990s. Two countries with significant 
negative trade effects (South Africa (–52%) and Kenya (–25%)) have been strongly 
affected by the spread of HIV/AIDS infections.  In South Africa seroprevalence increased 
from 1 % in 1990 to 25 % in 2000 (Karim and Karim, 1999; South Africa Department of 
Health, 2005).  This may obviously influence the trade liberalization effects since trade 
liberalization occurred in South Africa during the same decade.  However, not all cases of 
negative trade liberalization effects are correlated with the spread of HIV.  For example, 
in Mauritania (–24%) trade liberalization occurred during the 1990s and the spread of 
HIV/AIDS was low in comparison to other SSA countries.23 
 The problem with testing whether the spread of HIV has affected our results is that 
we do not have a consistent dataset for HIV infections in the pre-treatment period.  Data 
on HIV are only available in a consistent way since 1990 which makes it impossible to 
integrate it into the SCM analysis.   
Table 2 presents the average HIV infections in the post-treatment period of our SCM 
analysis for the three groups of countries (significant positive trade liberalization effect, 
                                                          
23 Mandzik  and Young (2014), attributed the low HIV/AIDS diffusion in Mauritania to religion, i.e. the 
large prevalence of Muslim in that country. 
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no significant effect, and significant negative effect).  The HIV prevalence (as a share of 
the population between 15 and 49 years) is much higher in the significant negative effect 
(at 5.8%) than in the not significant group (at 3.3%) and even more compared to the 
positive significant group (at 1.1%).  While this comparison obviously does not provide a 
real test of the HIV effect, the data in Table 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that the 
strong negative effects of trade liberalization in some of the African countries can be 
partially explained by the spread of HIV which occurred around the same period.  
6. Other Factors and the Heterogeneity of Effects 
In Section 5 we documented differences in trade effects between different political 
regimes.  We also searched for correlations of the trade liberalization effects with other 
factors that could potentially explain the heterogeneity of the trade reform effects on child 
health.  We found interesting correlations with country income level and  with agricultural 
policy (reforms).  
6.1  Income Level 
As mentioned already, the fact that SSA countries perform so poorly compared to 
other regions and that SSA is the poorest region raises the question whether the 
differences in effects of trade liberalization may be caused by income differences. A 
country’s income level, or level of development more generally, may influence the trade 
reform effects because low income countries typically have weak institutions and poor 
infrastructure. A weak institutional framework, poor infrastructure, and limited private 
and public resources in general may constrain the reallocation of production factors 
(including poor people’s labor) to be more efficiently used in order to realize the gains 
from trade (see Bardhan, 2006). For the poor for whom child mortality is highest, these 
factors may also constrain health policies to be effective in response to a changed 
economic and social environment.  
To check whether our findings are consistent with the argument that the effect of 
trade liberalization on child mortality may be influenced by the level of development 
(income), we divided the sample of treated countries in two groups: countries with below 
median (“lower”) income levels and countries with above average (“higher”) income 
levels at the time of the liberalization.  
The results in Figure 4 show that the reduction of child mortality in countries with 
higher income at the time of liberalization was indeed significantly stronger then in lower 
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income countries. After 5 years, child mortality in the higher-income group is 9% lower 
than the counterfactual (p-value < 0.04), and after 10 years is 12.4% lower (p-value < 
0.01). The lower-income country group instead experienced an average reduction of only 
2.8% after 5 years (p-value < 0.01), which increases to 6.9% after 10 years (p-value < 
0.01). These results are consistent with the argument that the effect of trade liberalization 
on child mortality is more positive in countries that, at the time of the reform, have a 
better institutional framework, better infrastructure, and more resources to allow the 
reallocation of production factors (including poor people’s labor) to be more efficient to 
realize the gains from trade. 
6.2 Agricultural Policy Reform 
Many of the poorest people in the world, which is the main social location of child 
mortality, are employed in agriculture, either as smallholder farmers or as farm workers.  
One can therefore imagine that the profitability in agriculture would affect child mortality 
by influencing an important source of poor people’s income. Trade liberalization may 
affect or may coincide with changes in agricultural incomes. 
In many countries in the world governments heavily intervene in food and 
agricultural markets.  Studies have shown that these government interventions are not 
random but follow a pattern: rich countries subsidize their farmers while poor countries 
tend to tax their agricultural sectors (Anderson 2010; Krueger et al. 1988).  This was 
especially the case in the 1970s and 1980s before many agricultural policy reforms were 
implemented around the world (Anderson et al. 2013). Since many agricultural products 
are traded, these policy reforms have often coincided with trade policy reforms.  
Therefore the extent to which trade liberalization has affected farmers, e.g. through the 
removal of export taxes, may help to explain the impact on the poor, and thus on child 
mortality.   
There is casual evidence from our country results to support this argument.  For 
example, in Ghana, one of the few SSA countries which benefited significantly from trade 
liberalization, the reform of Ghana’s trade policy reduced export taxation on key 
agricultural commodities (in particular cocoa which is a very important commodity for 
Ghana) and this coincided with an overall liberalizing of its agricultural policy (see 
Thomas 2006). These reforms reduced agricultural taxation and contributed to a 
significant reduction in poverty and inequality in Ghana’s rural areas (Coulombe and 
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Wodon, 2007).24  Similarly, in Sri Lanka, which has one of the most positive effects of 
trade liberalization in Asia, the trade liberalization caused a reduction of the taxation of 
agricultural export crops, especially tea, coconuts and rubber. Taxation of these main 
export products fell from around 40% before the trade liberalization to 20% after the 
reforms, contributing to agricultural productivity growth and significant poverty reduction 
(De Silva et al. 2013; Karunagoda et al. 2011). Also in Latin America, several countries 
where the impacts of trade liberalization on child mortality have been very positive 
according to our estimations, the trade liberalizations strongly reduced taxation of 
agriculture.  This was, among others, the case in Chile (31%),25 Mexico (18%) and Brazil 
(27%) (Anderson and Nelgen, 2013).  Finally, in MENA the trade liberalizations with 
positive impacts on child mortality in, for example, Tunisia (17%), Turkey (33%) and 
Egypt (25%) have coincided with a reduction in taxation of agriculture and reduced rural 
poverty (Anderson and Nelgen, 2013; Chemingui and Thabet 2003).  
In order to test more systematically whether our estimated trade liberalization effects 
are correlated with agricultural policy reform, we make use of the Nominal Rate of 
Assistance to agriculture (NRA) from Anderson (2009) and Anderson and Nelgen (2013).  
The NRA is an indicator of the extent of subsidization (positive NRA) or taxation 
(negative NRA) of the agricultural sector through government policies (including border 
trade policies, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers).  To check the role of and 
relationship with agricultural policy, we classify our trade liberalizing countries in two 
different groups: one group where the NRA increased more than the mean NRA change 
(and where farmers (at least potentially) benefited more than average from trade 
liberalization) and one group where the NRA increased less than the mean.   
The results in Figure 5 show that the reduction of child mortality in countries with 
higher NRA growth – hence a stronger reduction in agricultural taxation after the reform – 
was significantly stronger than in lower NRA growth countries. After 5 years, child 
mortality in the higher-NRA group is 10% lower than the counterfactual (p-value < 0.01), 
and after 10 years is 13% lower (p-value < 0.01). The lower-NRA group experienced an 
                                                          
24 For example, the agriculture nominal rate of assistance increased from an average level of 23% in the 
decade before the trade reform to 2.8% in the decade after. This trend is due to both a strong reduction in 
commodities export taxation (especially cocoa), and a switch from taxation to subsidization of import-
competing commodities, such as rice and maize (see Anderson and Valenzuela, 2008).   
 
25 In Chile, the nominal rate of assistance in agriculture shifted from an overall level of taxation equal to –
10%, in the ten years before the start of trade reform (1976), to a level of protection of 15% in the ten years 
later (see Anderson and Nelgen, 2013). For an in depth discussion about agricultural policy reforms in 
Chile, see Anderson and Valdés (2008).   
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average reduction of only 2.8% after 5 years (p-value < 0.01) and 5.4% after 10 years (p-
value < 0.01).    
These results are consistent with the argument that poor people in developing 
countries (which are the ones primarily confronted with child mortality) benefit from trade 
liberalization if it benefits the sectors they work in, in this case agriculture as the poor are 
still mainly concentrated in rural areas and depending on agriculture for their income.  
This is also consistent with the more general argument that what matters for the reduction 
of child mortality (and reduction of poverty more generally) is not just trade reform per 
se, but the nature of the trade reform and which sectors it affects. 
7. Concluding remarks  
There are few empirical studies on the effects of trade liberalization on health, and these 
studies have empirical limitations.  We hope to contribute to this literature (and this 
question) by using a different methodology:  the synthetic control method.  We analyzed 
the effect of trade liberalization on child mortality, exploiting 41 trade reform episodes 
during the last half-century. The use of this method allows the construction of better 
counterfactuals and to control for the time-varying nature of unobserved heterogeneity.  
Our results show that on average trade liberalizations reduced child mortality, but the 
effects differ significantly across countries and regions.  In all regions of the developing 
world, except SSA, there have been significant benefits from trade liberalization, on 
average. At the country level, almost half of the countries experienced a significant 
positive effect, almost half experienced no effect and in three countries, all in SSA, there 
was a negative effect.   
Robustness tests indicate that the results are not due to spill-over effects and not 
driven by the simultaneous occurrence of political reforms (i.e. democratization).   
Our additional analysis suggests that the negative effects of trade reforms in a few 
SSA countries is correlated with the simultaneous spread of HIV/AIDS in these countries.  
However, there are insufficient data to draw strong conclusions on this, and we cannot test 
whether this correlation is due to the independent simultaneous occurrence of both or 
whether trade has contributed to HIV/AIDS spread and thus worsened child mortality.   
Overall the heterogeneity of the trade liberalization impact on child mortality is 
correlated with country income levels (higher income countries have stronger positive 
effects), their political systems (democracies show better impacts than autocracies) and 
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the extent to which trade liberalization reduced taxation on the agricultural sector, the 
main source of employment and income for the poorest people who are disproportionately 
confronted with child mortality.  The last findings are consistent with the argument that 
when trade reform improves the conditions in agriculture, the effect of trade reform on 
child mortality appears to be better. 
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Table 1. Summary of the SCM Results at the Country Level 
 
Notes: The Table summarizes the key SCM results at the country level reported in details in Table A1-A4 of 
the Appendix A. The magnitude of the “average treatment effect” of trade liberalization on the U5MR is 
measured as the % deviation of the treated country in comparison to the (counterfactual) synthetic control.  
p-value is not available (n.a.) for those countries showing a RMSPE > 6, where a good counterfactual could 
not be constructed. See Text. 
  
T+5 (%) T+10 (%)
1 Nepal Asia 1991 32.42% 41.21% 3.07 0.00
2 Perù        Latin America 1991 26.09% 34.46% 1.74 0.00
3 Turkey  MENA 1989 18.58% 33.95% 0.80 0.01
4 Chile      Latin America 1976 35.11% 31.50% 3.65 0.01
5 Egypt     MENA 1995 24.64% 29.67% 5.70 0.01
6 Sri Lanka Asia 1977 11.65% 28.11% 0.47 0.07
7 Brazil    Latin America 1991 17.05% 27.27% 0.51 0.02
8 Guatemala Latin America 1988 12.69% 25.64% 0.56 0.06
9 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 11.35% 23.80% 0.61 0.01
10 Philippines Asia 1988 17.63% 22.07% 3.08 0.08
11 Bangladesh Asia 1996 14.76% 21.02% 6.00 0.08
12 El Salvador Latin America 1989 11.76% 19.98% 1.25 0.02
13 Gambia     Sub-Saharan Africa 1985 12.97% 19.13% 2.50 0.06
14 Mexico  Latin America 1986 12.15% 18.50% 0.66 0.11
15 Ghana     Sub-Saharan Africa 1985 11.60% 17.97% 1.40 0.11
16 Tunisia MENA 1989 10.54% 17.55% 0.65 0.12
17 Nicaragua  Latin America 1991 12.39% 17.38% 0.72 0.01
18 Indonesia Asia 1970 7.10% 15.20% 0.94 0.07
19 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa 1996 6.04% 11.23% 1.41 0.18
20 Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa 1998 -1.90% 8.47% 1.14 0.39
21 Morocco MENA 1984 3.46% 8.01% 0.21 0.37
22 Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 1993 -4.97% 7.37% 12.42 n.a.
23 Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 3.45% 5.52% 0.52 0.16
24 Guyana Latin America 1988 9.04% 4.82% 3.25 0.20
25 Honduras   Latin America 1991 4.40% 4.80% 0.52 0.21
26 Uganda     Sub-Saharan Africa 1988 2.07% 4.76% 6.27 n.a.
27 Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa 1999 0.66% 4.08% 0.25 0.09
28 Cote d'Ivory Sub-Saharan Africa 1994 -1.39% 2.94% 1.68 0.39
29 Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa 1987 -1.35% 2.86% 1.96 0.54
30 Benin    Sub-Saharan Africa 1990 6.88% 2.66% 1.52 0.17
31 Guinea     Sub-Saharan Africa 1986 1.08% 2.12% 23.20 n.a.
32 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa 1996 -0.98% 0.09% 1.76 0.17
33 Paraguay Latin America 1989 4.30% -0.32% 1.34 0.25
34 Colombia    Latin America 1970 4.46% -1.24% 5.56 0.40
35 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 1993 -14.66% -2.34% 3.04 0.20
36 Dominican Republic   Latin America 1992 0.91% -4.72% 0.44 0.26
37 Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 2.33% -6.57% 2.62 0.32
38 Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa 1979 -4.90% -7.33% 0.51 0.34
39 Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 1994 -22.71% -22.67% 4.55 0.00
40 Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 -6.13% -24.14% 0.40 0.12
41 South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 -15.85% -51.97% 0.22 0.09
p-value
Average Treatment Effect
# Country Region
Year of 
Reform      
(T 0 )
RMSPE
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Table 2. Average HIV infections in the post-treatment period by group of countries 
 
Note: Data on HIV prevalence are taken from The World Bank and refer for each country to the post 
treatment period.  
 
 
Figure 1. Average Treatment Effect Across all 41 SCM experiments 
 
Notes: The figure reports the dynamic treatment effects aggregated across all the 41 reform effects using the 
equation (5); the corresponding p-value, computed as discussed in section 2.2, is reported in the text (in 
bracket). Before aggregating the individual country estimates are normalized by setting the child mortality 
of the treated country equal to 1 in the year of trade reform, T0. 
Avgerage HIV prevalence  
(% of pop. ages 15-49)
Std. Error
Number of 
countries
Positive and Significant Effect 1.1% 2.03 19
No Significant Effect 3.3% 4.23 19
Negative and Significant Effect 5.8% 5.50 3
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Figure 2. Average Treatment Effect Aggregated at Regional level 
 
Notes: The figure reports the dynamic treatment effects aggregated at regions level using the equation (5); 
the corresponding p-values, computed as discussed in section 2.2, are reported in the text (in bracket). Each 
regional effect is obtained by averaging the contribution of all the treated countries within the same region 
in terms of yearly deviation of the outcome variable (U5MR) with respect to the one of the respective 
synthetic control. Countries used for estimating the average regional effects for Asian countries correspond 
to those reported in Table A1, while countries reported in Table A3 and Table A4 have been used to 
estimate the average regional effect for Latin America and North Africa and Middle East (MENA), 
respectively. Countries used to estimate the average regional effect for Africa are those reported in table 
A2a and A2b, with the exception of Uganda, Zambia and Burkina Faso, which have been excluded due to 
their extremely high value of RMSPE, which make them potential outliers in the estimation of the average 
regional effect. See Text. 
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Figure 3. Average Treatment Effect Across Different Political Regimes 
 
 Notes: The Figure reports the average treatment effect of trade reforms aggregated across different political 
regimes using equation (5); the corresponding p-values, computed as discussed in section 2.2, are reported 
in the text (in bracket). “Transition to democratizations” corresponds to trade liberalizations that occurred 
near political reforms in the following five countries (in parenthesis the year of democratization): Burundi 
1999 (2001); Guatemala 1988 (1986); Nepal 1991 (1990); Nicaragua 1991 (1990); and Philippines 1988 
(1987). “Democracy” correspond to trade liberalization that occurred in consolidated democracies in the 
following seven countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, El Salvador, Gambia, Perù, Sri Lanka and Turkey. Finally, 
“Autocracy” correspond to trade liberalizations that occurred in permanent autocracies in the following six 
countries: Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, Tanzania and Tunisia. See text. 
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Figure 4. Average Treatment Effect in High vs. Low income Groups 
 
Notes: The figure reports the dynamic treatment effects aggregated across income groups (High vs. Low) 
using the equation (5); the corresponding p-values, computed as discussed in section 2.2, are reported in the 
text (in bracket). Each income group effect is obtained by averaging the contribution of all the treated 
countries within the same group in terms of yearly deviation of the outcome variable (U5MR) with respect 
to the one of the respective synthetic control.  
  
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
R
e
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 i
n
 C
h
ild
 M
o
rt
a
lit
y
 (
%
)
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
year
Lower Income Countries Higher Income Countries
Average Treatment Effect by Level of Income
36 
 
Figure 5. Average Treatment Effect in High vs. Low NRA Growth Rate 
 
Notes: The figure reports the dynamic treatment effects aggregated across NRA growth rate groups (High 
vs. Low) using the equation (5); the corresponding p-values, computed as discussed in section 2.2, are 
reported in the text (in bracket). Each NRA growth rate group effect is obtained by averaging the 
contribution of all the treated countries (with NRA data) within the same group in terms of yearly deviation 
of the outcome variable (U5MR) with respect to the one of the respective synthetic control. Countries 
belonging to the Low-NRA growth rate group are: Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cotè d’Ivory, 
Cameroon, Colombia, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. Countries 
belonging to the High-NRA growth rate group are: Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Mozambique, Philippines, Turkey, and Uganda.    
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Appendix A. Detailed results of the Synthetic Control case studies 
 
Table A1. SCM results: Covariates and average effects for Asian countries  
 
Notes: Countries used to build each Synthetic control, and relative weights in parenthesis. Synthetic Indonesia: 
Cameroon (0.127); India (0.049); Philippines (0.066); Papua Nuova Guinea (0.117); Trinidad and Tobago (0.07); 
Tunisia (0.232); Uganda (0.338). Synthetic Sri Lanka: Algeria (0.019); Nicaragua (0.098); Paraguay (0.125); Trinidad 
and Tobago (0.585); Venezuela (0.173). Synthetic Philippines: China (0.105); Iraq (0.58); Papua New Guinea (0.315). 
Synthetic Nepal: Malawi (0.011); Senegal (0.989); Synthetic Bangladesh: Haiti (0.969); Iran (0.031).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia 
1970
Synthetic 
Control
Sri Lanka 
1977
Synthetic 
Control
Philippines 
1988
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.29 0.36
Log GDP per-capita 6.52 7.26 6.68 8.89 7.58 7.81
Rurale population 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.70 0.64 0.60
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Primary school 8.85 5.68 9.49 27.47 20.98 3.98
U5MR T0 165.20 165.06 59.30 59.42 65.60 66.83
U5MR T+5 139.89 151.62 42.10 49.01 49.90 61.46
U5MR T+10 120.00 145.11 24.40 41.07 42.09 56.58
RMSPE 0.94 0.47 3.08
Nepal     
1991
Synthetic 
Control
Bangladesh 
1996
Synthetic 
Control
War 0 0 0.00 0.01
Log GDP per-capita 6.39 7.12 6.58 7.31
Rurale population 0.95 0.68 0.87 0.77
Population growth 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Primary school 0.46 12.68 9.49 2.78
U5MR T0 135.00 141.57 108.10 117.50
U5MR T+5 103.50 147.26 83.59 99.56
U5MR T+10 77.20 132.83 63.40 86.12
RMSPE 3.07 6.00
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Table A2a. SCM results: Covariates and average effects for African countries (1) 
 
Notes: Countries used to build each Synthetic control, and relative weights in parenthesis. Synthetic Botswana: 
Argentina (0.001); China (0.158); Algeria (0.12); Panama (0.092); Syria (0.629). Synthetic Ghana: Algeria (0.016); 
Central African Republic (0.588); Panama (0.006); Papua New Guinea (0.027); Senegal (0.083); Syria (0.096); Togo 
Botswana 
1979
Synthetic 
Control
Ghana     
1985
Synthetic 
Control
Gambia     
1985    
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0
Log GDP per-capita 7.21 7.44 7.19 7.01 7.12 6.13
Rurale population 0.92 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.78 0.95
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
Primary school 4.92 6.19 3.52 3.93 0.54 4.61
U5MR T0 76.60 76.71 154.70 154.83 203.30 206.42
U5MR T+5 58.29 54.54 128.10 146.05 169.70 196.06
U5MR T+10 48.20 42.58 113.30 141.10 141.00 179.89
RMSPE 0.51 1.40 2.50
Guinea     
1986
Synthetic 
Control
Guinea-
Biss. 1987
Synthetic 
Control
Uganda     
1988    
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.25 0.00
Log GDP per-capita 6.67 6.27 6.88 6.66 6.50 6.78
Rurale population 0.82 0.93 0.83 0.83 0.93 0.74
Population growth 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
Primary school 5.22 6.42
U5MR T0 259.60 252.70 211.70 209.05 180.40 183.24
U5MR T+5 235.30 238.10 201.60 198.73 169.60 173.33
U5MR T+10 201.50 207.00 185.00 191.06 157.39 165.99
RMSPE 23.20 1.96 6.27
Benin         
1990   
Synthetic 
Control
Cape Verde 
1991
Synthetic 
Control
South Africa 
1991   
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.26 0.27
Log GDP per-capita 6.76 6.78 6.97 7.66 8.55 8.47
Rurale population 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.65 0.52 0.52
Population growth 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Primary school 2.51 8.39 8.98 6.67
U5MR T0 180.70 181.85 59.1 59.93 59.30 59.41
U5MR T+5 158.20 170.63 47.50 49.54 61.70 52.30
U5MR T+10 147.40 152.21 35.50 38.76 76.70 45.88
RMSPE 1.52 0.52 0.225
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(0.185). Synthetic Gambia: Burundi (0.597); Malawi (0.403. Synthetic Guinea: Malawi (1.0). Synthetic Guinea 
Bissau: Central African Republic (0.171); Chad (0.829). Synthetic Uganda: Central African Republic (0.519); 
Malawi (0.207); Senegal (0.274). Synthetic Benin: Central African Republic (0.144); Malawi (0.383); Papua Nuova 
Guinea (0.063); Senegal (0.41). Synthetic Cape Verde: China (0.301); India(0.124); Iran (0.453); Syria (0.122). 
Synthetic South Africa: China (0.016); Gabon (0.219); Haiti (0.016); Iran (0.305); Iraq (0.243); Syria (0.2).  
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Table A2b. SCM results: Covariates and average effects for African countries (2)   
 
Notes: Countries used to build each Synthetic control, and relative weights in parenthesis. Synthetic Cameroon: Rep. 
Dem. Congo (0.72); Algeria (0.206); China (0.074). Synthetic Kenya: China (0.3); Gabon (0.061); Iran (0.093); 
Malawi (0.228); Senegal (0.317);  Synthetic Zambia: Central Africa Republic (0.859); Malawi (0.141). Synthetic 
Cote d'Ivore: Central African Republic (0.676); Rep. Dem. Congo (0.165); China (0.165). Synthetic Mauritania: 
Cameroon 
1993   
Synthetic 
Control
Kenya  
1993
Synthetic 
Control
Zambia  
1993
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Log GDP per-capita 7.47 6.86 6.99 6.42 7.15 6.69
Rurale population 0.72 0.69 0.87 0.76 0.66 0.72
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
Primary school 10.32 2.77 16.32 9.76 8.92 4.67
U5MR T0 143.50 136.36 106.00 95.84 192.40 177.02
U5MR T+5 155.10 134.06 112.90 88.83 179.10 169.54
U5MR T+10 134.60 131.25 103.50 79.47 143.30 157.48
RMSPE 3.039 4.55 12.422
Cote d'Ivory   
1994
Synthetic 
Control
Mauritania 
1995
Synthetic 
Control
Mozambique 
1995
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.00
Log GDP per-capita 7.25 6.63 7.21 6.96 5.86 6.35
Rurale population 0.67 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.88 0.89
Population growth 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Primary school 3.73 5.49 13.45 11.69 5.32 8.22
U5MR T0 152.3 149.01 118.60 118.50 208.40 206.69
U5MR T+5 147.40 145.28 110.50 103.23 165.70 170.99
U5MR T+10 134.50 138.98 101.70 73.07 131.50 117.85
RMSPE 1.680 0.402 2.617
Tanzania 
1995
Synthetic 
Control
Ethiopia 
1996
Synthetic 
Control
Madagascar 
1996
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log GDP per-capita 6.37 7.08 6.06 6.66 6.89 7.11
Rurale population 0.87 0.70 0.90 0.86 0.82 0.80
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Primary school 12.82 7.98
U5MR T0 159.60 159.38 167.70 172.07 131.80 132.62
U5MR T+5 131.50 149.62 139.70 136.17 138.06 110.56
U5MR T+10 90.10 128.09 101.90 102.06 76.69 91.50
RMSPE 0.613 1.76 1.41
Burkina Faso 
1998
Synthetic 
Control
Burundi 
1999
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03
Log GDP per-capita 6.37 6.98 6.12 6.56
Rurale population 0.91 0.74 0.96 0.73
Population growth 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Primary school 6.26 6.21
U5MR T0 191.40 191.59 151.30 151.39
U5MR T+5 174.00 170.37 138.5 140.12
U5MR T+10 131.60 147.82 115.8 124.57
RMSPE 1.14 0.25
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China (0.3); Gabon (0.061); Iran (0.093); Malawi (0.228); Senegal (0.317). Synthetic Mozambique: Malawi (0.902); 
Senegal (0.096). Synthetic Tanzania: Central African Republic (0.495); Gabon (0.141); Malawi (0.164); Senegal 
(0.199). Synthetic Ethiopia: Haiti (0.401); Malawi (0.599). Synthetic Madagascar: Haiti (0.854); Malawi (0.146). 
Synthetic Burkina Faso: Central African Republic (0.106); Rep. Dem. Congo (0.101); Malawi (0.018); Nigeria 
(0.621); Chad (0.155). Synthetic Burundi: Central African Republic (0.594); China (0.134); Rep. Dem. Congo 
(0.155); Malawi (0.117). 
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Table A3. SCM results: Covariates and average effects for Latin American countries 
 
Notes: Countries used to build each Synthetic control, and relative weights in parenthesis. Synthetic Chile: Panama 
(0.58); Syria (0.42). Synthetic Colombia: China (0.219); Rep. Dem. Congo (0.066); Algeria (0.084); Iran (0.104); Syria 
(0.494); Swaziland (0.033); Synthetic Mexico: Burundi (0.051); China (0.288); Papua Nuova Guinea (0.061); Syria (0. 
6). Synthetic Guyana: Central African Republic (0.084); China (0.916). Synthetic Guatemala: Algeria (0.027); Gabon 
(0.221); Haiti (0.025); Senegal (0.298); Syria (0.429). Synthetic El Salvador: Algeria (0.038); Iran (0.57); Senegal 
Chile      
1976
Synthetic 
Control
Colombia     
1970
Synthetic 
Control
Mexico  
1986
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.09
Log GDP per-capita 8.32 7.81 8.28 7.71 8.90 7.13
Rurale population 0.26 0.56 0.43 0.56 0.39 0.68
Population growth 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Primary school 24.97 16.42 20.42 3.41 15.69 5.86
U5MR T0 57.10 62.70 40.40 45.70 56.20 57.26
U5MR T+5 30.00 50.05 34.09 35.90 43.80 50.63
U5MR T+10 22.10 40.08 28.90 29.79 32.70 43.10
RMSPE 3.65 5.56 0.66
Guyana 
1988
Synthetic 
Control
Guatemala 
1988
Synthetic 
Control
El Salvador 
1989
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.23
Log GDP per-capita 7.93 6.15 8.35 7.87 8.31 8.32
Rurale population 0.70 0.80 0.64 0.61 0.58 0.57
Population growth 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03
Primary school 41.30 11.60 7.34 7.89 10.37 6.40
U5MR T0 63.10 63.61 88.40 88.92 62.60 64.23
U5MR T+5 55.29 61.00 69.50 80.72 46.90 54.26
U5MR T+10 48.79 51.84 55.09 77.77 33.90 46.41
RMSPE 3.25 0.56 1.25
Paraguay 
1989
Synthetic 
Control
Brazil    
1991
Synthetic 
Control
Honduras   
1991
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.32 0.03 0.16
Log GDP per-capita 7.82 7.00 8.46 8.09 7.91 8.05
Rurale population 0.60 0.67 0.39 0.51 0.68 0.59
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
Primary school 15.14 7.54 15.51 5.59 10.79 5.09
U5MR T0 47.20 48.22 59.20 59.62 56.20 57.08
U5MR T+5 39.59 41.63 44.20 54.29 45.09 47.57
U5MR T+10 33.79 33.65 30.79 46.95 36.29 39.00
RMSPE 1.34 0.52
Nicaragua  
1991   
Synthetic 
Control
Perù        
1991
Synthetic 
Control
Dominican 
Rep.   1992
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.00 0.15
Log GDP per-capita 8.05 8.18 8.46 8.08 8.18 7.93
Rurale population 0.52 0.54 0.40 0.58 0.54 0.59
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Primary school 9.10 6.44 14.18 8.19 7.72 5.54
U5MR T0 63.30 63.40 74.90 77.84 55.00 55.33
U5MR T+5 49.70 57.54 53.60 73.14 44.70 45.20
U5MR T+10 38.10 49.10 37.00 62.81 37.29 34.70
RMSPE 0.72 1.74 0.44
0.51
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(0.122); Syria (0.27). Synthetic Paraguay: Central African Republic (0.018); China (0.44); Syria (0.542). Synthetic 
Brazil: Iran (0.237); Iraq (0.353); Senegal (0.132); Syria (0.277). Synthetic Honduras: Haiti (0.095); Iran (0.349); 
Papua Nuova Guinea (0.055); Senegal (0.022); Syria (0.478). Synthetic Nicaragua: Algeria (0.034); China (0.011); 
Gabon (0.009); Iran (0.366); Iraq (0.224); Senegal (0.155); Syria (0.202). Synthetic Perù: Iran (0.465); Iraq (0.04); 
Senegal (0.316); Syria (0.179). Synthetic Dominican Republic: China (0.033); Iran (0.311); Malawi (0.077); Syria 
(0.58).  
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Table A4. Covariates and average effects for Middle East and North Africa countries 
  
 
Notes: Countries used to build each Synthetic control, and relative weights in parenthesis. Synthetic Morocco: Algeria 
(0.038); Burundi (0.046); Central African Republic (0.112); China (0.008); Egypt (0.396); Iraq (0.058); Papua Nuova 
Guinea (0.117); Syria (0.225). Synthetic Tunisia: Algeria (0.161); China (0.036); Senegal (0.116); Syria (0.687). 
Synthetic Turkey: Algeria (0.092); China (0.027); Iran (0.216); Senegal (0.322); Syria (0.344). Synthetic Egypt: 
Algeria (0.627);  Haiti (0.373). 
  
Morocco 
1984
Synthetic 
Control
Tunisia 
1989
Synthetic 
Control
Turkey  
1989
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.12
Log GDP per-capita 7.29 7.30 7.99 7.70 8.44 7.80
Rurale population 0.64 0.64 0.53 0.58 0.58 0.60
Population growth 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Primary school 1.94 2.89 5.88 4.73 18.12 7.23
U5MR T0 108.40 108.34 53.90 54.26 78.10 79.47
U5MR T+5 83.80 87.55 41.40 47.08 58.00 72.51
U5MR T+10 66.40 75.09 31.50 40.96 40.59 67.11
RMSPE 0.208 0.648 0.798
Egypt     
1995
Synthetic 
Control
War 0.06 0.05
Log GDP per-capita 7.30 7.95
Rurale population 0.57 0.64
Population growth 0.02 0.03
Primary school 3.54 2.47
U5MR T0 64.20 73.49
U5MR T+5 45.10 60.92
U5MR T+10 31.20 50.25
RMSPE 5.70
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Appendix B. Placebo Tests  
 
Figure B1 Placebo tests for Asian SCM Experiments with “Positive” Reform Effects 
 
Notes: the bold line reports the outcome difference between each treated unit and the synthetic control; instead the grey 
dash lines report the outcome differences between each (false) treated country (from the donor pool) and their synthetic 
control in the placebo tests.    
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Figure B2a. Placebo tests for African SCM Experiments with “Positive” Reform Effects  
 
Notes: the bold line reports the outcome difference between each treated unit and the synthetic control; instead the grey 
dash lines report the outcome differences between each (false) treated country (from the donor pool) and their synthetic 
control in the placebo tests.    
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Figure B2b. Placebo tests for African SCM Experiments with “Positive” Reform Effects  
 
 
Notes: the bold line reports the outcome difference between each treated unit and the synthetic control; instead the grey 
dash lines report the outcome differences between each (false) treated country (from the donor pool) and their synthetic 
control in the placebo tests.    
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Figure B3. Placebo Tests for Latin America Experiments with “Positive” Reform Effects  
 
Notes: the bold line reports the outcome difference between each treated unit and the synthetic control; instead the grey 
dash lines report the outcome differences between each (false) treated country (from the donor pool) and their synthetic 
control in the placebo tests.    
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Figure B4. Placebo Tests for MENA SCM Experiments with “Positive” Reform Effects  
 
Notes: the bold line reports the outcome difference between each treated unit and the synthetic control; instead the grey 
dashed lines report the outcome differences between each (false) treated country (from the donor pool) and their 
synthetic control in the placebo tests.    
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Appendix C: Robustness Check to SUTVA 
Table C1: Summary of the SCM Results Accounting for Possible SUTVA Violation   
 
Notes: The Table summarizes the key SCM results at the country level by excluding from the donor pool those countries 
that share a national border with the treated unit in order to account for the possible violation of the SUTVA. The SCM 
experiments presented in bold are those where border countries were included in the synthetic control in the previous 
(baseline) experiments. The right hand side of the table presents the SCM results for these countries when excluding 
from the donor pool the border ones. The magnitude of the “average treatment effect” of trade liberalization on the 
U5MR is measured as the % deviation of the treated country in comparison to the (counterfactual) synthetic control. The 
detailed results for the SCM experiment in bold are not shown to save space, but are available upon request. Percentage 
differences between the average treatment effect in treated and untreated countries are obtained by considering 
normalized values of child mortality (i.e. child mortality in treated countries equal to 1 at time T0). 
 
# Country Region Average Treatment Effect Average Treatment Effect
T+5 T+10 T+5 (%) T+10 (%)
1 Nepal Asia 1991 32.42% 41.21% 3.07 0.00 32.42% 41.21% 3.07 0.00
2 Perù        Latin America 1991 26.09% 34.46% 1.74 0.00 26.09% 34.46% 1.74 0.00
3 Turkey  MENA 1989 18.58% 33.95% 0.80 0.01 23.14% 40.76% 1.63 0.01
4 Chile      Latin America 1976 35.11% 31.50% 3.65 0.01 35.11% 31.50% 3.65 0.01
5 Egypt     MENA 1995 24.64% 29.67% 5.70 0.01 24.64% 29.67% 5.70 0.01
6 Sri Lanka Asia 1977 11.65% 28.11% 0.47 0.07 11.65% 28.11% 0.47 0.07
7 Brazil    Latin America 1991 17.05% 27.27% 0.51 0.02 17.05% 27.27% 0.51 0.02
8 Guatemala Latin America 1988 12.69% 25.64% 0.56 0.06 12.69% 25.64% 0.56 0.06
9 Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 11.35% 23.80% 0.61 0.01 12.95% 33.88% 1.83 0.04
10 Philippines Asia 1988 17.63% 22.07% 3.08 0.08 19.06% 24.16% 3.10 0.09
11 Bangladesh Asia 1996 14.76% 21.02% 6.00 0.08 14.76% 21.02% 6.00 0.08
12 El Salvador Latin America 1989 11.76% 19.98% 1.25 0.02 11.76% 19.98% 1.25 0.02
13 Gambia     Sub-Saharan Africa 1985 12.97% 19.13% 2.50 0.06 12.97% 19.13% 2.50 0.06
14 Mexico  Latin America 1986 12.15% 18.50% 0.66 0.11 12.15% 18.50% 0.66 0.11
15 Ghana     Sub-Saharan Africa 1985 11.60% 17.97% 1.40 0.11 6.73% 12.00% 1.37 0.13
16 Tunisia MENA 1989 10.54% 17.55% 0.65 0.12 4.51% 6.97% 0.47 0.10
17 Nicaragua  Latin America 1991 12.39% 17.38% 0.72 0.01 12.39% 17.38% 0.72 0.01
18 Indonesia Asia 1970 7.10% 15.20% 0.94 0.07 8.72% 19.03% 1.06 0.04
19 Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa 1996 6.04% 11.23% 1.41 0.18 6.04% 11.23% 1.41 0.18
20 Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa 1998 -1.90% 8.47% 1.14 0.39 -1.90% 8.47% 1.14 0.39
21 Morocco MENA 1984 3.46% 8.01% 0.21 0.37 3.22% 7.91% 0.20 0.25
22 Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa 1993 -4.97% 7.37% 12.42 n.a. -4.24% 0.96% 15.97 n.a.
23 Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 3.45% 5.52% 0.52 0.16 3.45% 5.52% 0.52 0.16
24 Guyana Latin America 1988 9.04% 4.82% 3.25 0.20 9.04% 4.82% 3.25 0.20
25 Honduras   Latin America 1991 4.40% 4.80% 0.52 0.21 4.40% 4.80% 0.52 0.21
26 Uganda     Sub-Saharan Africa 1988 2.07% 4.76% 6.27 n.a. 2.07% 4.76% 6.27 n.a.
27 Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa 1999 0.66% 4.08% 0.25 0.10 0.96% 5.70% 0.30 0.10
28 Cote d'Ivory Sub-Saharan Africa 1994 -1.39% 2.94% 1.68 0.39 -1.39% 2.94% 1.68 0.39
29 Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa 1987 -1.35% 2.86% 1.96 0.54 -1.35% 2.86% 1.96 0.54
30 Benin    Sub-Saharan Africa 1990 6.88% 2.66% 1.52 0.17 6.88% 2.66% 1.52 0.17
31 Guinea     Sub-Saharan Africa 1986 1.08% 2.12% 23.20 n.a. 1.08% 2.12% 23.20 n.a.
32 Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa 1996 -0.98% 0.09% 1.76 0.17 -0.98% 0.09% 1.76 0.17
33 Paraguay Latin America 1989 4.30% -0.32% 1.34 0.25 4.30% -0.32% 1.34 0.25
34 Colombia    Latin America 1970 4.46% -1.24% 5.56 0.40 4.46% -1.24% 5.56 0.40
35 Cameroon Sub-Saharan Africa 1993 -14.66% -2.34% 3.04 0.20 -14.64% -2.3% 3.04 0.17
36 Dominican Republic   Latin America 1992 0.91% -4.72% 0.44 0.26 0.91% -4.72% 0.44 0.26
37 Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 2.33% -6.57% 2.62 0.32 18.09% 30.09% 59.21 n.a.
38 Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa 1979 -4.90% -7.33% 0.51 0.34 -4.90% -7.33% 0.51 0.34
39 Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa 1994 -22.71% -22.67% 4.55 0.00 -22.71% -22.67% 4.55 0.00
40 Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa 1995 -6.13% -24.14% 0.40 0.12 -0.98% -0.85% 0.26 0.41
41 South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa 1991 -15.85% -51.97% 0.22 0.09 -15.85% -51.97% 0.22 0.09
Baseline Model Considering SUTVA
Year of 
Reform      
(T 0 )
p-valuep-valueRMSPE RMSPE
